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Abstract. Surveying the ways–along with the whys and hows–of connecting law and 
philosophising, as contrasted to the appearances of modern formal law, it is concluded that in 
the final analysis law is a façon de parler–a specific communication, or game carried out 
in an open scene–, an actual event, if one played by humans practicing whilst simultaneously 
referencing it. The contemporary outcome of reflection upon its developments is (1) the 
reduction of legal philosophising to discourse-reconstruction, in terms of which instead of the 
issue of “what is it?”, “all that notwithstanding: how can it be achieved?” is usually raised; (2) 
the unresolved enigma of natural law, calling for axiology to define at least some foundational 
standards as stepping stones (albeit without a claim that any statement has genuinely concluded 
from them or been subordinated to them, as in the classical era when natural law and positive 
law were at odds); and (3) positive law without legal positivism, according to which a new 
synthesis and correlation amongst humans’ natural, societal and intellectual worlds is expected 
to be reached. At the same time, flourishing at the peripheries, a genuine foundation is coming 
to the fore, in order to suitably respond to global challenges. 
 
Keywords: modern formal law, legal complexity, ontology of law; natural law, legal positivism, 
globalisation  
 
 
Providing we had great truths indeed, they are not too many to change over 
time. In addition, I do believe there were and there are such. Nevertheless, the 
change of time does not so much concern the truth of something anyway, but 
rather–just as old recognitions live on in us too, so as to (when confronted to 
new problems) reveal new colours and connections, foreshadowing a deeper 
message–the enrichment and inner improvement of such truths, similar to the 
accumulation of experience in a lifetime (as concentric or nonconcentric circles), 
leading with new insights to incessantly renewing attempts at a synthesis 
momentarily taken. 
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1. Law and Philosophy 
 
It is our comprehension that originates the legal phenomenon. It is our com-
prehension that locates and presents law in a given form of phenomenon. The 
same comprehension that lets us perceive law in our social milieu at a given 
level and in a given way will let us perceive legal philosophy at another level 
and in another way. This law and this legal philosophy may then enter into 
communication with one another at levels and in ways according to their 
relationship. 
 
1.1. Connections 
 
Conceiving the world as the outcome of conscious planning, we may indeed 
declare (following the Evangelist of the New Testament who expressed it in 
unique conciseness) that “In the beginning was the Word”.1 On the other hand, 
relying on a rationalist explication founded on the mere empiricism of the laity 
of scholarship, on the basis of everyday experience we can contemplate a 
constantly renewing process of transforming our environment into increasingly 
complex structures through a series of self-organising artificial constructions. 
 In theology, on the one hand, law can from the outset be conceived of in the 
spirit of the human fulfilment of the work of Divine creation, as its application to 
human dimensions in implementation of the potentialities ordained by it. Or, we 
might even say that it is this theological philosophy itself that generates the 
law, by highlighting the former’s values when defining the various paths that 
may equally be followed within it. 
 However, on the other, approaching the issue from the opposite side, viewing 
it as one of the homogenisations necessarily arising on the terrain of the hetero-
geneity of our everyday existence, we obviously have to see in the development 
of legal homogeneity, in its strengthening and achieving social autonomy in 
more than one respect, some kind of a basically praxis-bound process, within 
which the piece of knowledge that reveals itself to those involved in general 
theoretical investigations directed at law is to embody the continuous ration-
alisation of the practical responses given to timely challenges. In the beginning, 
this rationalisation is probably only subsequent to actual developments at the 
most. However, after legal homogenisation is accomplished, it is certainly parallel 
to them, and when, with conscious social planning and engineering (in brief: legal 
voluntarism), it comes to the fore and becomes exclusive, it is of a determining 
force as well. 
  
 1 <http://scripturetext.com/john/1-1.htm>. 
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 Ever since humans started philosophising about their world, they have also 
been reflecting on its order, on the latter’s potentialities and limits. In this sense, 
legal philosophy is of the same age as human societal self-reflection. It by no 
mere chance that reasoning retrospectively, Greek philology has ever set the 
task for itself to reconstruct semantically–among others–the signs referring 
to the presence of some kind of law or legally relevant phenomena in the 
classical age, and designating them in one way or another, from the textuality 
of the available body of epic poems and from the mass of scattered linguistic 
fragments, in order to reconstruct those signs as contextualised by the 
contemporary worldview and underlying philosophy.2 And since the time that 
all human endeavours have been added up to form some kind of formal law–
whose archetypes can be encountered back in early legal formalisms (i.e., 
initiatives in the ancient Middle East and antique Greece and Rome, regarded 
today as primeval and analysed in modern reconstruction for the first time by 
Sir Henry Maine), albeit it began to achieve the level of its present-day domina-
tion from the reception of Roman Law, done first in Bologna, and in its most 
developed form as methodologically rigidified into doctrines, from the age of the 
codification of national laws in the 18th to 19th centuries3–, the positivity of the 
law (coming forward with a demand for acknowledgement of the law’s reality 
as a fact) apparently conceals the underlying circumstance that behind the law 
as a reified structure functioning, so to speak, with a mechanical automatism, 
there are real human beings operating it, conditioned by their everyday lives, 
who have to assume this thoroughly responsible and responsive moral task with 
the strength of all their faculties and capacities.4 
 At the same time, a more or less regular “maintenance” is needed to make 
this everyday operation possible, which includes the law’s cleaning (of useless 
parts and waste) and improvement (according to operational concepts and the 
  
 2 Cf., by the author: Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, 9 
et seq.  
 3 Cf., by the author: Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon. Budapest, 1991. 
 4 In an own explication, spanning between the two end-poles of the evolvement of my 
personal line of thought from problem perception to a systematic explanation, cf., by the 
author. Chose juridique et réification en droit: contribution à la théorie marxiste sur la base 
de l’Ontologie de Lukács. In Archives de Philosophie du Droit, 25. Paris, 1980, 385–411, 
on the one hand, and Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking. Budapest, 1999, on the 
other. See also, in an American context starting from leftist critical deconstructionism of 
the Critical Legal Studies, by Conklin, V. A.: Human Rights, Language and Law: A Survey 
of Semiotics and Phenomenology. Ottawa Law Review, 27 (1995–1996) 129 and The 
Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse The Judicial Production and the Disclosure of 
Suffering. Aldershot, 1998. 
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need to prevent its degeneration into social dysfunction), and also the constant 
clarification of the foundations required for its long term strategic further 
development. It is in the fulfilment of this latter function that the theoretical 
thought directed to law becomes visible to us again. 
 
1.2. Appearances of Modern Formal Law 
 
Regulation by law always takes place with the aim of pre-defining an unspecified 
and unforeseeable future and, thus, in view of granting itself an eternal validity. 
We know, nevertheless, that the routine arising from this is always temporary: 
after a certain period of time, the rules will inevitably be surrounded by a 
divergence from the rules (in form of exceptions), which sooner or later results 
in the formulation of new, more detailed rules. Behind the relative permanence 
of the legal form, there are opposing interests pressing against each other, to 
be squeezed into, while being solved in, it. They continuously address–while 
questioning–the given form. Meanwhile, they render it liveable, by re-assessing 
its contents through its practical interpretation–extending, narrowing, or just 
re-shifting its scope. Or, jurists must reason in terms of alternativity, searching for 
a suitable form, while the due form eventually found, crystallised as adjusted 
to the given task, becomes itself a donné for the next challenge, to be further 
formed and, thereby, also to be transcended, albeit at the same time it remains 
the basic assurance of the continuation of the same cultural framework for legal 
problem-solving, that is, of the continued respect for traditions in patterning 
and being patterned alike. 
 We might say that, firstly, positive regulation, secondly, the Rechtsdogmatik 
(elaborating conceptual contexts based on the generalisation of past practice 
and, thereby, demarcating its ways open towards the future) as well as, thirdly, 
doctrine (laying the theoretical foundations of the given branches of regulation) 
collectively constitute only a few fundamentals for legal practice. Of course, 
all this is scarcely visible in those thoroughly technicised and profoundly 
reified cultures in which law is rigidified into routines (as enclosed in) to the 
extent of becoming alienated itself; where a mass of juridified relationships, 
procedures and activities may require the intervention of professional manage-
ment by legal technicians on a mass scale; and when our whole lives are almost 
entirely surrounded and mediated by various agencies of enterprise, trade and 
traffic, with standards reproduced in mass proportions. Well, such cultures are 
permeated with a constantly growing mass of formulas and thesauruses that 
have been generated, which then come to be broken down to procedural moduses, 
and subsequently generalised into blocks of schemes, only to be ultimately 
overfilled by interpretations interpreted and comments incessantly commented 
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upon. As is well known, all this takes place in view of the advancement of 
standardisation, implying extension to new fields, expansion in depth and 
details, as well as both application to relations altered in the meantime and, as 
a feed-back, re-consideration of the ratio underlying the given regulation. In 
our modern formal culture, it is all this that constitutes the medium of law-
application, providing its standard framework and serving as its unceasing 
renewal, that is, a constant Aufhebung transcendence in preservation of this 
unbroken process.5 
 These reified structures suggest an approach in terms of language use and 
communication, that is, an autotelism and a self-propelling mechanism that, in 
a constantly broadening way, reproduce earlier well-devised potentialities and 
paths covered as practices, or forms, of human activity, definitely specified. 
For their phenomenal form–namely, the conceptualisation of their culture–does 
conceal the creativity of human intellect, while still, nevertheless, operating in 
it, that is, the practical aspiration to respond to new challenges at any time 
and, thereby, of course, also the need for a humane coverage behind the human 
response and the irrevocable responsibility to be borne for the consequences as 
well. 
 The object of theoretical jurisprudence seems to have become invisible 
meanwhile, in this enchantment. But it is certainly there, in a three-fold sense 
at least. Firstly, it presents itself evidently in strategic planning and decision-
making, when we search the future or change this conceptualised culture as a 
result of new situations or modified recognitions. For intellectual constructions 
as considerations behind the formalistic pillars maintaining the appearance of 
routine need to be re-activated when, due to actual imperfections in regulation 
(even if with the appearance of formalistic automatism preserved), an original 
evaluation is taken in the form of a decision–either so gaps can be filled in law 
or in the classical cases of discretion. Secondly, germs of theoretical thinking 
are actuated non-evidently in everyday routine when we conceal our consequence-
oriented practical reasoning by seemingly un-problematic sequences of derivation 
in legal decision-making, leaving the job to a subsequent analytical reconstruction 
that reveals that nothing but a choice between alternatives was actually to take 
place. And thirdly, naturally, we cultivate theoretical jurisprudence and use its 
results when, applying it to our situation, we offer a scholarly explanation of 
our societal world. 
 
  
 5 Cf., by the author: Doctrine and Technique in Law. Iustum Aequum Salutare, 4 
(2008) 23. & <http://www.jak.ppke.hu/hir/ias/20081sz/02.pdf>. 
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1.3. Differentiation in Complexity 
 
The natural, societal and intellectual worlds of man constitute a kind of unity 
and continuity. Our natural environment is given even if we have altered it. 
The societal milieu around us has been brought about by the endless series of 
conventionalisations through generations (so we are, in fact, socialised to it as 
to something readily given, even if we constantly re-form it by our reconven-
tionalising contributions). At an intellectual level, we approach these at a critical 
distance but with our specific judgement added. In the final analysis, there are 
tendential correlations prevailing in the triad of humanity’s natural, societal 
and intellectual worlds, as the most varied impulses and recognitions, creative 
efforts and practical feedbacks that flow incessantly, are to bring about a state 
of equilibrium in any society, if viewed from a historical perspective. Anything 
that can be formed will eventually be formed in fact. This applies equally to 
our natural world and our concept of it,6 the way our social institutionalisation 
works by fulfilling its function, and also to our intellectuality in all of this, 
forming them and being formed by our experience day to day. Neither a value 
judgement nor any approval is involved, only that a fact is established if we 
ascertain now that the complexity of our social existence has brought about a 
compound, internally so articulated in historical time, also that a process of the 
Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts7 has taken place in it, in the major part of 
civilisations and cultures at least. Our social objects, reified practices and 
alienated products are all embodied by objectivations that we have to consider–
nolens, volens–as part of our societal world, to be treated as independent subjects 
of cognition. 
 Law? This is something prevailing and operating, with a place firmly 
demarcated by universally shared social conventions in our everyday life. 
Apparently, it separates from anything else solidly like a rock, and only a 
theoretically deconstructive reconstruction can prove after the fact that, in the 
ultimate analysis, law is hardly more than a manner of speech, specific communi-
cation or a game collectively played. This is all that can be taken as real–
  
 6 John Lukács mentions a noteworthy example in his At the End of an Age 2002 (in 
Hungarian translation Egy nagy korszak végén. Budapest, 2005, 128, note 80), related to 
the change of the cultural landscape of the Swiss mountains, describing how it developed 
from bleakness too dreary for life to a serene charm of prosperity, which the author attributes 
to the change in human understanding in the meantime and to their human habitation, 
based first of all on societal adaptation to the milieu. 
 7 Cf. Niklas Luhmann Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie 
und Rechtstheorie. Frankfurt am Main, 1981.  
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inasmuch as it is actually used as a basis of reference.8 However, according 
to the law’s own rules of the game, such a specific (legal) communication 
presupposes from the outset that such references are actually made at every 
major crossroads and at each new start. And the extent to which such references 
can be made at all is delimited by so-called validity in that order of speech. 
And validity covers the field generated according to this very rule of the game.9 
 
 
2. Conclusions 
 
First of all, two substantial conclusions ensue from all this. Both might have 
already been obvious decades ago. However, they are elucidated with proper 
sharpness only because our age involves so many dangers and threats. Finally, 
a third conclusion can also be drawn from these, based on some tendencies 
already visible in our present. 
 
2.1. Legal Philosophising Reduced to Discourse-reconstruction 
 
As can be seen, legal theorising starts above all by rendering problematic that 
which may appear unproblematic in everyday life, that is, when we question 
the seemingly self-evident, notably, the why and wherefore of the judicial 
routine’s alleged rule-conformism–with proper impoliteness and irreverent 
disrespect of tradition. Well, it is this–namely, the systematic cultivation of 
heretical incredulity that may in principle arise in any participant of the so-
called judicial event, if organised into a grand-theory–that goes on nowadays 
mostly under the aegis of professional legal theorising. What I have in mind 
here is a kind of contrast. For, just a few decades ago, we inquired–solemnly 
and seriously–into the “epistemology and methodology of law”, the “theory 
of jural relations” and the law’s voluntary nature, as well as all kinds of other 
labels and features attributed or related to law; just as, first, the biophysicist, 
then, the biochemist approach the (animal/human) body, only to hand over 
their symbolic lancet to the anatomist, and finally to the pathologist, enabling 
  
 8 As known, Scandinavian legal realism did the most for having this realised. Cf., e.g., 
Visegrády, A. (ed.): Scandinavian Legal Realism. Budapest, 2003 and, as a background, 
by the author: Skandináv jogi realizmus [Scandinavian legal realism] in: Varga Cs. (ed.): 
Jogbölcselet XIX–XX. század: Előadások Lectures on 19th to 20th century philosophy of 
law. Budapest, 1999, 81. 
 9 Cf., by the author: Validity. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 41 (2000) 155 & 
http://www.situation.ru/app/j_art_724.htm & <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ 
klu/ajuh/2000/00000041/F0020003/00383612>. 
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each of them to cut out what they need–with the presumption that all we had 
thought about it also had to be seen in both the living and the dead. In such a 
corporeal view of law, muscles may have creaked and sinews and bones rubbed 
at the most; still the body as such could function. Well, in contrast to the 
forceful articulation of such a splendid simple-mindedness–sancta simplicitas–, 
what we do today is at the most to break forms and differentiate according to 
qualities related or ascribed to law in our speech acts. For what we do here is 
analysis: we operate concept with concept and lift it (as latter-day followers of 
baron Munchausen) out of what is itself, in order to finally place it back into 
what is again just itself. Instead of the old-fashioned, static dissection of the 
law’s allegedly discrete (i.e., separately examinable) composing parts, we now 
make a theory out of what we once were prudently reluctant even to notice. As 
a somewhat bizarre example, this is as if, in athletics (and due to some strange 
motive), we suddenly started to concentrate–instead of on efforts or the implied 
aesthetics–on the body’s urinary output or perspiration curves, that is, on the 
so-far concealed problem of how the judge can proceed by means of steadily 
manifesting the appearance of being logical when the inference that is practical 
anyway is anything but logical. 
 This change in character shows clearly that we are more fashion-conscious 
than we had thought ourselves to be, at least in one sense of the word. Notably, 
our interest in any given subject (including the underlying selection made) is 
also promoted by the trends of the age. Today, the question is raised not in terms 
of “what?” but in terms of “in spite of all that: in what way?” For, we do not see a 
naturally given donné in the subject but a virtual construction to be decon-
structed. In reality, we cut pieces from our subconscious under the microscope. 
We boast of being quite detached in scholarship while we have become 
narcissistic self-dissectors in practice. The spirit of our age focuses as to 
contemporary theoretical jurisprudence not only on the issue of “how?” but has, all 
of a sudden, created a human reflex or conceptual relation out of yesterday’s 
interconnection of independent entities. So, we do search for phrases and fre-
quency in linguistic practice (i.e., the preliminaries supposed to be sensible of 
a seemingly sensible statement) in the law–instead of inquiring as to its “reality” 
earlier believed to exist.10 
 All this is not turning grey but is a projection of, or mental reaction to, the 
change of the very subject of cognition as a socially generated objectivation. 
 
  
 10 As a background, cf., by the author: Theory and Practice in Law: On the Magical 
Role of Legal Technique. Acta Juridica Hungarica, 47 (2006) 351 & <http://www.akademiai. 
com/content/j4k2u58xk7rj6541/fulltext.pdf>. 
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2.2. The Query for Natural Law Unresolved 
 
The other conclusion relates to the prerequisite of such a practice, to the 
question of whether or not the law has the exclusive criterion of a validity 
exhausted by formal procedurality (preconditioned by some factually empirical 
and quantifiable efficiency), and whether or not any other factor (aspect or 
feature) can have any similar criterion-setting role. Providing that the law of our 
modernity has indeed developed in this way (i.e., in autonomous disconnection 
from other factors of social complexity, resulting in the law’s separation from 
its framework environment basically defined by theologicum and ethicum, 
permeating and eventually also dominating all forms of human attitude within 
the ordo of our social milieu), then obviously the social complexity’s qualities 
and imperativum, having once constituted the sine qua non condition of their 
minimum contents, also will vanish from what can by now be rightly called 
modern formal law.11 In this case, what is left of the feasibility of an axiological 
approach to law? It would be too little comfort to say that value-dependent 
approaches are unchangingly given free scope in legal policy Rechtspolitik and 
the theory of legislation [Gesetzgebungslehre] as well as in the doctrine of 
law-application [Rechtsanwendungslehre], re-arranging the alternative options 
(implying the moment of an independent decisio) into a unidirectional logical 
sequence of inference both verbally and culturally (as the latter does not 
necessarily raise awareness of the discretionary power that is made to work 
there by decision-makers anyway). 
 Regarding the, so-to-speak, permanent conflict between natural law and 
legal positivism,12 we can only ascertain that the former is increasingly losing 
ground up to the point that we cannot now think of this opposition otherwise 
than as the symbolic expression of the challenge since classical times (from 
ancient Greeks, via Romans and the Medievalists, to early modernity) to break 
away from the one-time role of ancilla theologiae to achieve the renaissance 
of human quality, practically transplanted onto our earthly order as well. 
Otherwise speaking, the respect for human interests (with sheer utility in focus) 
in praxis has found a most promising terrain in the meantime. And irrespective 
  
 11 Cf., by the author: Moderne Staatlichkeit und modernes formales Recht. Acta Juridica 
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 26 (1984) 235 and The Basic Settings of Modern 
Formal Law in: Gessner, W.–Hoeland, A.–Varga, Cs. (ed.): European Legal Cultures. 
Aldershot–Brookfield USA–Singapore–Sydney, 1996, 89.  
 12 See, e.g., Szabó, M. (ed.): Natura iuris Természetjogtan & jogpozitivizmus & ma-
gyar jogelmélet Natural law & legal positivism & Hungarian legal philosophy. Miskolc, 
2002. 
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of whether there is still monocracy or representative democracy has already 
been invented, the law itself has finally become optional, scarcely differing 
from the characterisation set out in the Communist Manifesto one and a half 
centuries ago: a will made dominant through having been wrapped into state-
controlled formalities.13 And, thereby, the desirability of linking the quality of 
right with the right14 is smoothly transferred into an issue of mere intellectuality 
and only for highbrows’ use. In other words, having arrived at modernity, our 
societal world has also separated from our intellectual world. For, in a criterion-
like way, the law itself has become value-free (or, properly speaking, value-
neutral), not followed (or only hesitatingly followed) due to lawyers’ professional 
ideology itself having become value-free or even cynical.15 
 We know from the research of a Hungarian-American Benedictine friar 
science historian16 that the history of science can explain the separation of 
Christianity and Islam (with the evolutionary ability of the very idea of scientia 
emerging exclusively from the former’s culture) by the fact that theological 
debates after the turn of the First Millennium had already declared the chance 
of our fallibility on earth, that is, that our Earth has indeed been made our 
possession, and our actual life our eventual fate, as Divine Providence is not to 
interfere with either the laws created in our world or our irrevocable choices 
between good and bad. Or, neither genuine ontology nor human anthropology 
(with the chance of humanity’s fall into sin) is excluded by far as true schol-
arly fields. Thereby, it is possible to formulate repetitive regularities as laws, 
and human striving for their cognition and honest actions within their terms 
are not faint-heartedness but rather the fulfilment of an assignment from the 
Creator. On the other hand, this awareness, born in Europe around the 11th to 
13th centuries and which allowed us to live happily in our world and ensured 
the subsequent renaissance–that is, the relative separation of the spiritual from 
the natural world–has not been repeated so obviously in societal and intellec-
tual aspects. 
  
 13 Cf., e.g., by the author: Marxizmus in Jogbölcselet [note 6], 24. 
 14 See Sebastião Cruz Ius. Derectum (Directum) Dereito (derecho, diritto, droit, direito, 
Recht, right, etc.) 7.a ed. Coimbra, 1986, and Lalinde Abadía, J.: Las culturas represivas 
de la humanidad (H. 1945) I–II. Zaragoza, 1992, as well as Kovács, F.: A magyar jogi ter-
minológia kialakulása [The evolution of Hungarian legal terminology]. Budapest, 1964. 
 15 For its ontological and epistemological interrelations, see, by the author. The Place 
of Law in Lukács’ World Concept. Budapest, 1985. 
 16 Jáki, Sz.: A természettudomány eredete [Lecture on the origin of natural science]. 
Győr, 1993 and Jaki, S. L.: The Origin of Science and the Science of its Origin. Edinburgh, 
1978, & The Road of Science and the Ways of God. Edinburgh, 1978, as well as his Jesus, 
Islam, Science. Pinckney, Mich., 2001. 
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 Just to refer to some great decisive events: for example, the great classical 
periods of natural law became, as it moved towards modernity, replaced by new 
constructs. However, the long-standing requirement of justification by natural 
law, on the one hand, and the frightening desolateness of the gap left after it 
was ousted from the proper terrain of law (with its space filled only by legal 
voluntarism), on the other, prevented the issue from being closed down entirely 
forever.17 
 The lack of a theoretical response re-appeared in a new light when, within 
the critical perspective of the Social Doctrine of the Church in the immediate 
present, the classical spiritual power raised its voice at last and started to speak 
up against the dehumanising dysfunctionality of the social and economic 
arrangements of the Western world. For it is obvious that the Gospel does have a 
message in general, but the question of what the indubitability of natural law 
(to the extent it can be so characterised) really means for positive law has not 
been answered reassuringly ever since the age of Saint Thomas Aquinas. 
Anyway, the commitment of our life on Earth does not allow us to handle 
ourselves, our societal surroundings or the order to be made on earth with the 
indifference characteristic of laws built into physicality and with a demand for 
total autonomy. As is well known, the social teaching of the Church obviously 
derives its arguments from the Gospel, but it does so through interpretation 
embedded into theological hermeneutics of the ages given at any time, combined 
with a striving to give a temporal answer adjusted to the situation hic et nunc, 
i.e., with a kind of optimisation of the expectations (conceived of as best) of 
the society and culture behind the actual teaching.18 
 Finally, the barbarity of the last century, then the debasement of person against 
person followed by the technocratic emptying of our future, accompanied by the 
unlimited exploitation of our planet’s reserves, that is, the ideocracy of socialism 
being replaced by the all-covering pragmatic homogenisation through globalism–
  
 17 In his oeuvre, Michel Villey analysed the process repeatedly in his Leçons d’histoire 
de la philosophie du droit nouv. éd. [1957]. Paris, 1962, Seize essais de philosophie du 
droit dont un sur la crise universitaire. Paris, 1969 and Critique de la pensée juridique 
moderne. Paris, 1976, as well as in his magisterial lecture notes on La formation de la 
pensée juridique moderne rév. Stéphane Rials, Paris, 2003.  
 18 The author referred to in the previous note struggled with the issue recurrently. He 
concluded that Saint Thomas Aquinas had already considered the very notion of practice-
bound secular laws as something separate , considering the fact that neither the Gospel nor 
any conception of natural law would be capable (or competent) to cover it throughout and 
directly. See Michel Villey Questions de Saint Thomas sur le droit et la politique ou le bon 
usage des dialogues (Paris) 1987, as well as, as fragments from him, éd. Frison-Roche, M.-
A.–Christoph, J.: Les Carnets Réflexions sur la philosophie et le droit (Paris) 1995. 
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along with the general mood of some ultimate scenario of finita la commedia!19–
have since World War II repeatedly raised the query of how to render the law 
autonomous. Well, the legal accountability for Nazi-type depravity (the so-called 
Radbruch-formula), the possibility to rebuild civil conditions in relative freedom 
from codal restrictions (“die Natur der Sache”), then, most pressingly nowadays, 
the unsolved issue of Latin American and other disintegrating failed societies, 
the squandering of our Planet’s resources using up humankind’s future, the anti-
human usability of the possibility of immeasurable manipulation generated by the 
newest technologies, the ultimate degradation of the Western world through 
an internal moral split of dual standards, enforced by diverging interests, and 
last but not least, the destructive dysfunctions arising from the universalisation 
of the Atlantic legal mind and US state-craft (as extended especially to the 
Eastern European regions and so-called developing societies, exposed to the 
imperialism of the American movements of Law & Modernisation and Law & 
Development)–all these call for some kind of external objective measure.20 
 Albeit we have to know that a revival of natural law in our day cannot target 
more than the expansion of sensitivities and the extension of the range of topics 
and aspects of investigation, with their re-integration into our culture. Other-
wise speaking, it cannot claim a new deduction [Ableitung] or subordination 
[subordinatio], as this would lead back again to a pre-scientism. Therefore, the 
question is partly open, waiting for both a response and a foundation in theory. 
 
2.3. Positive Law – Without Legal Positivism? 
 
As was pointed out earlier, things are mostly interconnected, and it is only due 
to a lack of perspective if we cannot perceive latent correlations for the time 
being. Well, our earlier thesis on the change of focus of theoretical legal thinking 
in the past few decades was largely due to the metamorphosis of our world-
view in the philosophy of science, a circumstance that may explain the tendency 
of law to have become increasingly immaterial, to be taken as hardly more 
  
 19 “The show’s over.” 
 20 Some cardinal aspects are analysed in a pathbreaking concise overview by the 
present pope, then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, in his Crises of Law an address delivered 
on the occasion of being conferred the degree of Doctor Honoris Causa by the LUMSA 
Faculty of Jurisprudence in Rome on November 10, 1999 in <http://www.ratzinger.it/ 
conferenze/crisideldiritto_eng.htm>. As to actualities in the region, cf., by the author: 
Transition to Rule of Law On the Democratic Transformation in Hungary (Budapest) 1995. 
and Transition? To Rule of Law? Constitutionalism and Transitional Justice Challenged in 
Central & Eastern Europe. Pomáz, 2008. 
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than a discursive process within the frame of specific communication21–such a 
thesis by no means supplies a sufficient (let alone exhaustive) explanation. It has 
been discernible in both the description of the Western European and Atlantic 
legal world22 and the design of the common codification of private substantive 
and procedural law in the European Union23 (requiring Hungarian participation 
as well from now on) that–starting from the era of Western rebuilding after 
the Second World War24–it is the resolution of the exclusivity of the law’s 
positivity (or being posited) that has been increasingly reckoned with. All this 
is palliated with fashionable liberal catch-words, labelled as democratisation, 
participation, or multi-factoralisation of the legal process. If, and insofar as, this 
resolution becomes dominant (as prognosticated by American macro-sociological 
grand-theories for decades now25), it will also obviously increasingly eliminate 
the alienating effect of the special modes of speech and culture of communi-
cation that may still have made the impression of being self-propelled in law 
and that have successfully ousted both pragmatic and evaluative reasoning from 
routine procedures, reducing them to mere pattern-following. 
 Accordingly, philosophical reflection on law with expectations of theory-
building is anything but a memory of the past. It is by far more an agenda 
addressing the future. Legal philosophising is going to become part of such a 
legal culture in constant formation.26 That is, what we will then call law will 
  
 21 See para. 2.1. 
 22 E.g., by the author: Meeting Points between the Traditions of English–American 
Common Law and Continental-French Civil Law (Developments and Experience of 
Postmodernity in Canada) Acta Juridica Hungarica, 44 (2003) 21. 
 23 E.g., by the author: La Codification à l’aube du troisième millénaire. In: Mélanges 
Paul Amselek org. Cohen-Jonathan, G.–Gaudemet, Y.–Hertzog, R.–Wachsmann, P.–
Waline, J.: Bruxelles, 2004, 779 & Codification at the Threshold of the Third Millennium. 
Acta Juridica Hungarica, 47 (2006) 89. & <http://www.akademiai.com/content/cv56l91505 
t7k36q/fulltext.pdf>. 
 24 In an edifying comparison with Central and Eastern European peripheries, see, above 
all, Kühn, Z.: Worlds Apart: Western and Central European Judicial Culture at the Onset of 
the European Enlargement. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 52 (2004) 531. 
 25 First of all, e.g., Nonet, P.–Selznick, P.: Law and Society in Transition. Toward 
Responsive Law. New York, etc., 1978. and Mangabeira Unger, R.: Law in Modern Society. 
Toward a Criticism of Social Theory. New York, 1976. As a contemporary reflection on 
these, see, by the author: Átalakulóban a jog? [Law in transition?] Állam- és Jogtudomány, 
23 (1980) 670. 
 26 Albeit “cultural lags” are too well known here as well. Cf., e.g., by the author: What is 
to Come after Legal Positivisms are Over? Debates Revolving around the Topic of ‘The 
Judicial Establishment of Facts’. In: Atienza, M.–Pattaro, E.–Schulte, M.–Topornin, B.– 
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define or demarcate its object together with what we think of it with good 
reason and conclusive force. We shall presumably remember legal philosophy 
up to the end of the 20th century as an interesting but mostly dated preliminary 
that undertook the task of founding (at a mega-level of science philosophy and 
science methodology) the science of the law that, in addition to positive analyses 
of a Rechtsdogmatik, dissected the law into parts–as a researcher examines an 
insect on his table or liquids in retorts, to be able to inspect each of its 
methodically separated components individually. It is conceivable that–as usual–
primarily those moments from this philosophising that might have contributed 
to the precise transcendence of this all will survive memorably for posterity. 
 The triad of the Hegelian thesis / antithesis / synthesis may prove to be rather 
too attractive. All that notwithstanding, I cannot ignore, by formulating my 
suspicion, that it will be a kind of repeated encounter, moreover, a reunification of 
the societal and the intellectual (referred to already several times) that will 
again re-occur in the legal philosophy of the near future. The aforementioned 
catch-words of the resolution (or dissolution) of the law’s positivistic self-
definition themselves seem to refer to something like this. The realm of values 
behind the law, demanding their re-integration in transcendence, also suggests 
something similar. Man is to return to himself (as I formulated somewhat 
lyrically in conclusion to my treatment of the law’s paradigms twenty years 
ago27), and theoretical thinking built on philosophical reflections may be the 
most adequate avenue to bring this about.  
                                                     
Wyduckel, D. (Hrsg.): Theorie des Rechts und der Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Werner 
Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag, Berlin, 2003, 657. 
 27 “We followed a path that led to law from the paradigms of legal thinking, and from 
the self-assertion of legal formalism to its overall cultural determination. Yet, our human 
yearnings peeked out from behind the illusory reference of our security and we could discover 
reliable, solid grounds only in the elusive continuity of our social practice. In the meantime it 
proved to be a process which we had thought to have been present as a material entity and 
what we had believed to be fully built up proved to build continuously from acts in an 
uninterrupted series. What we have discovered about law is that it has always been inside 
of us, although we thought it to have been outside. We bear it in our culture despite 
our repeated and hasty attempts at linking it to materialities. We have identified ancient 
dilemmas as existent in our current debates as well. We have found long abandoned 
patterns again. We have discovered the realisations of common recognitions in those 
potentialities and directions in law which we believed to have been conceptually marked 
off once and for all. / However, we have found an invitation for elaboration in what has 
revealed itself as ready-to-take. Behind the mask, and in the backstage, the demand for our 
own initiation, play, role-undertaking and human responsibility has presented itself. We 
havebecome subjects from objects, indispensable actors from mere addressees. And, we can 
be convinced that despite having a variety of civilisational overcoats, the culture of law is 
 LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, LEGAL THEORY 251 
  
 We live in a dangerous age. These dangers include the saturation of our 
environment with poisons, both in nature and in our societal world, as much as 
in our intellectuality–freed of standards, endangering mental survival itself. Forces 
ready to act are nowadays making experiments by erecting a new and idea-
controlled brave new world, and our perennial cultural diversity, homogenised 
in a global village, is being visualised by some as already accomplished.28 In 
one of the richest (yet in many respects most innocent) parts of the world, the 
future is feared as bringing with it commercialisation of legal education and 
scholarship, with the results of legal research being ordered in advance as 
ready clichés to justify whatever policies are desired. Such a resignation to 
predestination by fashionable global policies may emerge that finally we shall 
sink into, dragging like superannuated spinsters, a wretched life, drawing on 
what it may have left.29 
 There are several signs indicating that situations are always double-faceted. 
Now we cannot conclude more from such a threat than that it can also be 
beneficial to be a local on the peripheries. 
 
 
                                                     
still exclusively inherent in us who experience it day by day. We bear it and shape it. 
Everything conventional in it is conventionalised by us. It does not have any further 
existence or effect beyond this. And with its existence inherent in us, we cannot convey 
the responsibility to be borne for it on somebody else either. It is ours in its totality so 
much that it cannot be torn out of our days or acts. It will thus turn into what we guard it to 
become. Therefore, we must take care of it at all times since we are, in many ways, taking 
care of our own.” Varga: Lectures… [note 2 {first Hungarian ed. in 1997}], ch. 7, p. 219. 
 28 C.f., e.g., in representation of two poles, Zum 80. Geburtstag von Hermann Klenner. 
Berlin, 2006. [Joachim Herrmann, Gerhard Sprenger & Hermann Klenner, 1–55], on the 
one hand, and The Governance of Globalisation. The Proceedings of the Ninth Plenary 
Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences (2–6 May 2003). Vatican City, 2004. 
 29 For example, according to the cry for help by an author not inclined to pessimism 
otherwise, “L’enseignement sera une marchandise.” There may scarcely be other chance 
than “se vendre pour rester des facultés de droit dignes de ce nom, ou refuser de se vendre 
et vieillir comme des vierges stériles.” (16) “[L]e travail scriptuaire universitaire […sera…] 
se concrétiser comme »fournisseur de prémisses« justifiant toujours une quelconque politique 
ou une orientation idéologique” (17). The perspective therefore is hardly more than 
“l’exploitation de la recherche […] pour obtenir une légitimation, une justification des 
politiques étatiques ou de l’industrie.” (18) Melkevik, B. Scolies sur le futur des facultés 
de droit. Le verdict Audi alteram partem. Journal de la Faculté de Droit de l’Université 
Laval, Québec, 4 (2005) 14. 
